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JURISDICTION
This matter is an appeal of a final decision of the
Eighth District Juvenile Court terminating the parental rights
of Patrick Dean Coando.

This court has jurisdiction pursuant

to Utah Code Annotated § 78-38-51(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The pertinent statutory provisions are, the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. Chapter 21, §1901 et seq.; Utah Code
Annotated § 78-3a-401 to 414.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case originated as a petition for adoption, filed by
the natural mother Debra Jean Robertson, in Eighth
Court.

District

A petition was then filed to terminate the parental

rights of Patrick Dean Coando, the natural father.

The mater

was transferred to the Juvenile Court.
The

appellant

is

a

registered

member

Shoshone Tribe, as are the children.

of

the

Eastern

However, none of the

children have ever resided on the reservation and the family
maintained its domicile in the State of Utah.

The mother and

father were divorced on August 15, 1989, with the mother being
granted custody of the minor children.

Because the children

were eligible for enrollment in the tribe, but had never been
domicile on the reservation, the Juvenile Court ruled that 25
U.S.C.

§

1911(b) . applied

to

the

1

proceedings.

The

court

allowed the tribe to intervene in the case, but denied removal
to Tribal Court.

The court found that the case was between

parents and did not involve state agencies, that the natural
mother and children objected to removal, that the case did not
involve the removal of children from an Indian family, and
that there would be an undue burden if the trial were moved
out of state to Tribal Court.
Trial
District

was

held

Court.

on November

The mother

and

30, 1994, in the
father were

Eighth

present

and

represented by counsel, as was the Tribe.

The children were

represented

After

by

the

Guardian

ad

Litem.

Juvenile Court took the matter under advisement.

trial

the

On May 25,

1995, the Juvenile Court ruled in favor of the mother and
terminated the parental rights of the father, finding him to
be an unfit parent.

The Juvenile Court found that the ICWA

did not apply to the proceedings because there was no existing
Indian family unit or environment, the action was not for
removal of Indian children, and the fact of the case did not
fall within the scope of Congress' intent in establishing the
Indian Child Welfare Act.
The natural father appeals from this decision.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The

judgment

of

the

Juvenile

Court

terminating

the

parental rights of the Appellant should be upheld because the
facts justified a finding by clear and convincing evidence

2

that the father was unfit.

The Indian Child Welfare Act puts

no special burdens on the Appellee, as this is not an action
for removal of Indian children from an Indian home or natural
parent, nor are any state or private agencies involved in the
action.

As a result, state law was properly applied to the

proceedings.
the Juvenile

Further, jurisdiction was properly retained by
Court where

the

facts did

under the Indian Child Welfare Act.

not put

the

action

However, even if the Act

did apply, the standards and procedures required by the Act
were met, and any error in the rulings of the Juvenile Court
relating

to the application of the Act

amounts

to harmless

error.
ARGUEMENT

1.

The Juvenile Court correctly
as allowed under the Indian
USC 1911.
A.

The

The ICWA was enacted to protect the interests
of Native American Tribes and families against
unwarranted removal of children by state and
private agencies, not to grant tribal member
more rights than their non-member spouses.

ICWA was enacted

identities

retained
jurisdiction
Child Welfare Act, 21

in order to protect

of Native American

Tribes.

The

the

IWCA

cultural

recognized

that "there is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children."
25 USCS § 1901(3).

The removal of Indian children

from an

Indian family and their cultural setting eventually robs the

3

tribe of its members.

And prevents the knowledge of Indian

life from being passed on through oral traditions.

Prior to

the enactment of the IWCA,
an alarmingly high percentage of Indian
families
are
broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of
their children from them by nontribal
public
and
private
agencies
and that
an alarmingly
high
percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian
foster and adoptive homes and institutions;...
25 USCS § 1901(4), emphasis added. State court "often failed
to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people
and

the

cultural

communities

and

and

social

families."

standards prevailing

in

Indian

25 USCS § 1901(5), emphasis added.

From the congressional findings in 25 USCS § 1901, it is clear
that the purpose of the act is to protect the interest of the
tribe in its children from non-Indian governmental agencies.
Further, congress believed that the interest of the tribe was
damaged when
native

Indian children were removed

American

environment.

environment

to

be

placed

from a culturally
in

a

non-Indian

These interests which Congress sought to protect

are not of an individual

nature belonging

to an

individual

parent, but rather they belong to the tribe.
The stated policy was to:
protect the best interests of Indian children and to
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by the establishment of minimum federal
standards for the removal of Indian children from
their families and the placement of such children in
foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the
unique values of Indian culture. . .
25 USCS § 1902.

In the present case the children are not

4

being removed from their home nor is there a governmental
agency attempting to do so.
To protect

the rights of the tribe, the

ICWA grants

exclusive jurisdiction over Indian children that reside within
the boundaries of the reservation.
children

in

the

reservation.

present

case

have

25 USCS § 1911(a).
never

resided

on

The
the

In such cases, the ICWA also allows for the

transfer of jurisdiction to the tribe where there is no good
cause for the state court to retain jurisdiction, but this is
subject
1911(b).

to

the

"objection

of

either

parent."

25

USCS

§

The Tribe is also given the right to intervene in

the state court proceedings. 25 USCS § 1911 (c ).

The ICWA

also ensures full faith and credit to tribal courts.

However,

the claim that these safeguards amount to a "preference that
any

proceeding

to

terminate

the parent

rights

to

Indian

children be before the Tribal Court,'' (Appellant's Brief at
9.) is unwarranted.

Full faith and credit no more creates a

preference in tribal court than it dose in any other court in
the United States.

It merely guarantees that the Tribal Court

is treated equally.
In the present case, the tribe was allowed to intervene
and was represented by counsel.

However, the natural mother

(respondent) and custodial parent objected to transfer, as was
her right under the ICWA.

Memorandum Decision,

at 2. Further,

there was good cause for the court to retain jurisdiction.

5

Id.

Transfer

children

of

jurisdiction

and witnesses

reservation

upon

which

would

to travel
neither

have

forced

out or

state

mother

nor

to

mother,
a

tribal

children

had

resided.
B.

The
Juvenile
Court
properly
jurisdiction in this matter.

retained

The appellant argues extensively that the Juvenile Court
erred

in retaining jurisdiction.

Appellant

argues that the

court can only retain jurisdiction if there is good cause or a
Parent objects.

Appellant's Brief at 10.

Further, appellant

asserts that the court must "start with the presumption that
jurisdiction
appellant

be

then

transferred
brushes

to

aside

Tribal
the

Court."

parental

Id.

objection

The
by

claiming that an absolute veto would be "destructive to the
tribal interests."

Id.

at 11.

Appellant gives no reason why

it would be harmful to tribal interest, nor does he explain
how his suggestion of a "qualified veto" would work.
The policy and purpose of the IWCA was stated as follows:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy
of this Nation to protect the best interest of
Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families by the
establishment
of minimum
federal
standards
for
removal of children from their families and the
placement of such children in foster or adoptive
homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian
culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian
tribes in the operation of child and family service
programs.
25 USCS § 1902.

Further, Congress stated in §1901 that:

6

(4) That an alarmingly high percentage of Indian
families are broken up by the removal, often
unwarranted, of their children from them by non
tribal public and private agencies and that an
alarmingly high percentage of such children are
placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes
and institutions; and
(5) That the States, exercising their recognized
jurisdiction over Indian custody proceedings
through administrative and judicial bodies, have
often failed to recognize the essential tribal
relations of Indian people and the cultural and
social
standards
prevailing
in
Indian
communities.
25 USCS § 1901.
1) the

What Congress was addressing in the IWCA was

removal of children

from their

"Indian

families" by

"state and private agencies" and their placement outside the
family;

2)

the

failure

of

state

courts

to

recognize

the

interests of the tribe; and 3) the failure of state courts to
recognize the "cultural and social standards" prevailing in an
Indian family unit.

None of these concerns are at work in

this case.
First,

the

family unit.

children

are

not

being

removed

from

their

This action was instituted by the natural mother

and custodial parent of the minor children.

The children have

always resided with the mother and are not being removed from
her care nor from the home in which they are living.

Further,

there is no state or private agency involved in this case that
is attempting

to

custodial parent.

remove

the children

from

the

care of

the

The only involvement by any state agency

came about after trial as a result of the court ordering the
Department of Family Services to supervise visitation between

7

the father and minor children due to the father's history of
violent and abusive behavior, as well as the fears expressed
by the children to the court.
Second, the interests of the tribe were recognized
the tribe was represented

at trial by the tribal

and

attorney.

Further, the tribe was allowed to put on extensive testimony
at trial relating to its interests and cultural matters.

See,

Transcript of Hearing on 11/30/94 and 12/1/94, at 174 - 194.
From the testimony produced by the tribe, it was clear that
the

children

had

never

been

exposed

to

tribal

culture

or

society. Transcript of Hearing on 11/30/94 and 12/1/94 at 248;
See, id.

generally.

Nor would it have been possible for Mr.

Coando to teach the children of tribal culture and traditions.
See, Transcript of Hearing on 11/30/94 and 12/1/94 at 189-190.
Third, because there was no Indian family the

concerns

that the court n.ight not recognize the standards that exist
within

Indian society do not come into play.

knew nothing of Indian society.

The

Children

The cultural standards that

applied to the children and their family life was that of the
non-Indian community.
2.

THE
ICWA
ALLOWS
THE
STATE
COURT
TO
RETAIN
JURISDICTION
IF EITHER PARENT OBJECTS TO A TRANSFER
TO TRIBAL COURT.

Even leaving the policy issues aside, the Juvenile Court
still acted properly in retaining jurisdiction.
provides that in an action for the

8

Section 1911

termination of parental rights to, an Indian child
not domiciled or residing within the reservation of
the Indian child's tribe, the court, in the absence
of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such
proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent

the objection
25

USCS

§

by either

1911(b),

parent,

emphasis

. ..

added.

The

natural

Memorandum

objected to transfer of the case to Tribal Court.
and Decision,

mother

at 2.

The issue of jurisdiction was ruled upon by the court on
July 5, 1994.

In its ruling, the Juvenile Court found that 1)

the children were Indians within the meaning of 25 USCS §
1901; 2) Section 1911

(b) of the ICWA applied because the

children were not domiciled on the reservation; and 3) it was
the mother's burden to show good cause why the case should not
be transferred to tribal court.
1994.

Memorandum Decision,

July 5,

This is what the appellant asserts that this should be

the case in his brief.

And despite the fact that the Juvenile

Court applied these standards, the court still found that it
was appropriate to retain jurisdiction.
In its decision, the Juvenile Court noted that the "nonIndian

natural

mother

and

legal

custodian

of

the

children objects to the transfer of jurisdiction."

Id.

at 2.

The court stated:
That pursuant to the Bureau of Indian Affairs
Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody
Proceedings, section C2, the Indian Child Welfare
Act "gives the parents and the Tribal Court of the
Indian
child's
tribe
an
absolute
veto
over
transfers, and there is no need for any adversary
proceeding if the parents or the Tribal Court

9

opposes transfer."
Id.

The court also noted that even though the court was not

required to determine if a parent's veto was absolute, the act
at least made the "transfer to Tribal Court discretionary with
the State Court when there was an objection to the transfer by
either parent.

Id.

Even so, the court went on to find that there was good
cause.

Citing the Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines for

State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings section C2 and
C3, the court noted that the following constituted "good cause
to the contrary";
a. The Indian child is over 12 years of age and
objects to the transfer.
b. The evidence necessary to decide the case could
not be adequately presented to the tribal Court
without
undo
hardship
to the parties
or
witnesses.
Id.

citing the Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines for State

Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings section C2 and C3.
The Juvenile Court properly noted that "David Allen Coando and
Paul Dean Coando are twin boys, 14 years of age, who object to
the transfer of jurisdiction to Tribal Court."
Juvenile

Court

went

on

to

find

that

all

three

Id.

The

children

expressed serious fears regarding their father and their being
on the reservation, as a result forcing them to go to the
reservation for trial against their will "would be detrimental
to their physical and emotional well-being and not in their
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best interest."

Id.

The Juvenile Court also found that section 1911 (b) was
satisfied

in

that

there

would

be

undue

hardship

if

the

petitioners were forced to travel to Wyoming for Tribal Court.
Both parties had resided primarily in Utah and most of the
witnesses lived in the Vernal area.

Further, many of the

witnesses were older and that an "undue hardship will be
placed upon them to travel to the Tribal Court in Wyoming".
Id.

It is interesting

to note that the Bureau of

Indian

Affairs has specifically recognized the doctrine of forum
conveniens

in its guidelines for state courts. The Montana

Supreme Court also supported this view.
Bertelson,
3.

non

See, Application

of

617 P.2d 121, 125 (Mont. 1980).
ALTHOUGH THE JUVENILE COURT RULED THAT THE ICWA DID
NOT APPLY THE EVIDENCE STILL MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE ICWA.

In addition the Juvenile Court noted that the ICWA was
designed to protect the Indian family from being broken up by
"non-tribal public and private agencies".

Id.

Further, the

Juvenile Court found specifically that there was "no state
agency seeking to remove the Indian children from their Indian
home.

The issue of termination of parental rights is between

the natural parents and custody of the children will remain
with a natural parent."

Id.

Finally, the Juvenile Court considered all these issues

11

together

and

weighed

"the

interests

of

the

Indian

Tribe

pertaining to its children and its sovereignty with those of
the parents, in this case each parent individually, and the
Id.

interests of the children."

After weighing the competing

interests the court found that the matter fell under 25 USC §
1911(b), however,
the controversy is between two parents and does not
involve the breakup of Indian families by the
removal of Indian children by non-tribal public and
private agencies or the placement of the children in
non-Indian foster or adoptive homes.
Good cause
exists to retain the matter in the State Court. The
custodial parent objects to the transfer, and this
Court finds that it does not run counter to the
intent of the ICWA to retain jurisdiction in the
State Court.
Memorandum

Decision,

at 4.

In making its ruling on jurisdiction, the Juvenile Court
took

into

consideration

several

interest

of

the

children,

interest

of

the

tribe,

factors,

hardship

the

on

objections

including

the
of

parties,
the

mother

transfer, the objection of the two 14-year old boys.
these

together

jurisdiction.

justified

best

a finding of good cause

the
to

All of
to keep

This is true, even when discounting the fact

that the wording of the ICWA grants a parent the right to veto
transfer

when

reservation.

the

children

are

not

domiciled

on

the

Appellant's argument that jurisdiction was based

solely on the doctrine of forum

non conveniens

as grounds for

good cause is simply not supported by the facts.
Appellant's extremely belabored argument that forum

12

non

conveniens

does

not

apply because

of

its placement

in a

discussion located in house report 1386 is lacking in merit.
Further, if the court were to adopt Appellant's position there
would be no doctrine of forum

non

conveniens.

In his brief, Appellant relies on a number of cases which
are

not

controlling

Mississippi

in

the

case

Band of Choctaw Indians

at hand.

For example,

v. Holyfield.

dealt with the sole issue of domicile. Mississippi
Choctaw

of

490 US 30, 42, 104 L.ED 2d 29,

42, 109 S.Ct. 1597 (1989).

In that case the parents, who were

tribal

v.

Band

Holyfield,

both

Indians

Holyfield

members

and

residents

of

the

reservation,

intentionally went off the reservation for the birth of their
illegitimate child.

The purpose of this act was to avoid

tribal jurisdiction and give the child up for adoption.

The

Supreme Court ruled that domicile was that of the parents
{Holyfield,

490 U.S. 48.), and that individual tribal members

could not avoid exclusive tribal jurisdiction simply by having
Id.

the baby off the reservation.
similar to Matter

of

Adoption

of

at 51.

Halloway,

These facts were
732 P.2d 962 (Utah

1986), where a child was taken off the reservation shortly
after birth to be given up for adoption.
domicile was on the reservation.
relevant to the case at hand.
of parental objection.

The Court found that

The issue of domicile is not

Nor is it relevant to the issue

All parties agreed that the children

never resided on the reservation.

13

Memorandum Decision,

July

5,

1994,

allows

Therefore,

an

only

section

individual parent

1911

(b)

applies

to object to removal

which

to

Tribal

Court in actions that are already pending in state court.
A.

IN CASES FALLING UNDER 25 USC
PARENTAL VETO IS ABSOLUTE.

§ 1911(B)

THE

Appellant asserts that Congress intended for there to be
a "qualified veto" in order to deny removal to Tribal Court.
Brief of Appellant, at 12.

No justification for this position

is given other than the claim that allowing "an absolute veto
would

foster

with

same

Id.

Holyfield."
dealt

the

a

type

This

of

disregards

completely

different

domiciled on the reservation.
exclusive jurisdiction.

forum

shopping

the

fact

issue,

rejected

Holyfield

that

that

in

of

a

child

In that situation the Tribe has

25 USCS § 1911(a).

It is only in a

case such as the present one, where the child is not domiciled
on the reservation, that gives rise to a parental
being

allowed.

relating
the

to parental

statute

cases.
party

25

has

USCS

§

1911(b).

objection

Appellant's

object, therefore, lacks merit

already

limited

the

objection

to

argument
because
certain

The only forum shopping that is available is where a
seeks

to

avoid

the

state

proceedings to the Tribal Court.
removed from the Tribal Court.
position

on

parental

objection

court

by

removing

The proceedings cannot be

Further, adopting appellant's
disallow

the

objection,

there would be no grounds which would justify its use.

14

the

as

forum

Appellant cites a number of other cases relating to
non

conveniens,

argument.

however, none of them add anything to the

They relate primarily to the fact that the doctrine

"should be

limited to meeting

the objective of the ICWA"

(Brief of Appellant at 14, citing In the Matter
and

Neglect

of

A.L.,

442 N.W.2d 233

of

Dependency

(S.D. 1989)), and that

"the Court should consider the rights of the child, the rights
of the tribe and the rights of the parents" (Id.
Interest

of

C.W.,

the

479 N.W.2d 105 (Neb. 1992)), all of which

were done by the court.
1994.

citing In

See, Memorandum Decision,

July 5,

The Juvenile Court went beyond simply considering the

objection

of

traditional

the

parent,

factors

or

the

concerning

children,

forum

non

considered all the factors together as well.

or

the

conveniens,

other
and

When considering

all these factors together there can be no doubt that the
Juvenile Court properly retained jurisdiction in this matter.

4.

THE JUVENILE
OWN
RULINGS.

COURT

HAS

AUTHORITY

TO RECONSIDER

ITS

The Appellant makes the claim that the Juvenile Court
erred in reconsidering a prior decision. This claim is based
upon the Memorandum Decision of July 5, 1994

(attached as

appendix), and the final ruling of the Court dated June 29,
1994,

(attached as appendix).

doctrine

of

"law

of

the

Appellant

case"
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prevents

asserts
the

that the

court

from

reconsidering a prior ruling by a different judge of the same
court

in

the

same

case.

Brief

of Appellant,

at

17-19.

However, Appellant noted that there are circumstances where
the court may reconsider a previous ruling.

For example, if

the court believes it has made an error or if new facts are
Trembly

presented.

v.

Mrs.

Fields

Cookies,

884 P. 2d 1306,

1311 (Utah App. 1994).
A.

THE JUVENILE COURT
PREVIOUS DECISION.

DID

NOT

OVERRULE

ITS

Although the Juvenile Court stated that it reconsidered
the previous ruling, the court did not actually overrule the
previous decision.

Judge Lindsay's Memorandum Decision of

July 5, 1994, addressed only the issue of whether the case
should be transferred to Tribal Court.

In that decision,

Judge Lindsay found that Section 1911(b) of ICWA applied to
the proceeding.

This section deals solely with the transfer

of a case to Tribal Court, not the standards and procedures
for the actual trial.

25 USCS § 1911.

Judge Wilson did not

address this issue, did not overrule it, nor was there a need
to

do

so.

Judge

Lindsay

had

already

determined

that

jurisdiction should remain with the Juvenile Court and the
Tribe was allowed to intervene. Judge Wilson decision went to
the Tribe's motion to dismiss, which was an entirely different
matter

from the

Appellant's

jurisdictional

argument

that

the

16

ruling.
Juvenile

As

a result, the

Court

erred

in

reconsidering Judge Lindsay's ruling is not relevant in this
case, or amounts to harmless error.
5.

THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE STANDARDS FOR
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE ICWA DID
NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE

The court properly found that the ICWA did not apply.
There were several significant
decision.

factors that justified this

First, the court found that "this action is not for

the removal of Indian children from an existing family unit".
Finding
also,

of

Facts,

Memorandum

Order

and

Decision

family unit. Finding

of

Decree,

at

4.

Facts,

2, June

Second, there was no Indian

Order

and Decree,

2.

state or private agencies were involved. Finding
Order

and Decree,

2; Memorandum

See

29, 1995;

and Decision,

Third, no

of

Facts,

at 4.

The Juvenile Court found that the "specific facts of this
case

are

not

within

the

scope

of

Congress'

establishing the Indian Child Welfare Act.

intent

in

Therefore, the

court concludes that the legal and procedural standards of the
Indian Child Welfare Act dose not apply in this case."
of

Facts,

Order

and Decree,

Finding

2.

The stated policy of Congress was to:
protect the best interests of Indian children and to
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by the establishment of minimum federal
standards for the removal of Indian children from
their families and the placement of such children in
foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the
unique values of Indian culture. . .

17

25 USCS § 1902.

Of main concern was the breakup of "Indian

families'' by nontribal public and private agencies

(25 USCS §

1901(4)),

"essential

tribal

and the failure of courts to recognize

relations.

prevailing

. .and the

cultural

in Indian communities

1901(5).

and

and

social

families."

standards
25 USCS §

Nowhere is an action by one parent against the other

mentioned.

An action between private parties, where one is a

non-indian "does not fall within the ambit of the Indian Child
Welfare Act."
(Mont. 1980).

Application

of

Bertelson,

617 P.2d

121, 125

Nor was the Act "directed at disputes between

Indian families."

Id.

The purpose was to grant a certain

amount of protection to the cultural identity of Indian Tribe
and a recognition of the cultural values existing in an Indian
family.

See,

25 USCS § 1901(3).

This does not mean that an

Indian parent was to be granted greater rights than the nonIndian custodial parent.

Nor does it mean that all aspect of

the ICWA apply in every case.
In the present case, the children were enrolled as tribal
members after the mother initiated the action for termination
of parental rights.

As a result, the Tribe was allowed to

intervene in the proceedings and counsel was appointed for the
father.

See,

25 USCS § 1911 ( c) ; § 1912(a),

not all parts of the ICWA apply in all cases.

(b) .

However,

Section 1911(a)

as already discussed above, applies only in cases where the
child

is domiciled on the reservation.
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Other

sections

can

only

reasonably

be

attributed

intervention by state agencies.

to

cases

were

there

is

An example of this is section

1912(d), which requires remedial services and rehabilitative
programs be provided.
A.

A PARENT SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE
SAME REMEDIAL SERVICES AS IS THE STATE IN A
REMOVAL ACTION.

Appellant argues that the mother provide "remedial and
rehabilitative programs and preventative measures designed to
prevent the break up of the Indian family must be undertaken
and these efforts proven unsuccessful".
22, citing 25 USCS § 1912(d).

Brief of Appellant at

The problems with this is that

such programs can only be provided by governmental agencies.
They require expertise to establish and millions of dollars to
run.

It would be unreasonable and unfair to require the

parent to provide such programs.
ICWA deals with governmental
Parent" issues.)

(This is one reason why the

agencies and not "parent vs.

At best, the mother could be held to attempt

reasonable efforts to prevent the breakup of the family.
this

she

did.

The

father

Transcript of Hearing on
generally.

never

supported

11/30/94 and

And

the children.

12/1/94,

20 - 101,

Even making his wife pay him to baby sit the

children.

Id.

wife. Id.

When he was in prison for assault on the mother,

the mother

at 69.

took

He physically and mentally abused the

the children

to see him.

Id

at

22-24.

However, the father's violent and abusive behavior made it

19

impossible and unreasonable for the mother to do more than she
did.

Further, it was the children's desire that they not see

the father.

Id.

at 24; See, testimony of David Coando and Pau

Coando,

generally,

require

a mother,

225-249.
who

had

It

would

been

be

severely

unreasonable

mistreated,

children were terrified of their father, to do more.
the

father

undertook

never

provided

any reasonable

support

for

the

to

whose

Further,

children

or

efforts on his part to repair

the

relationship.
B.

THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE AN INDIAN FAMILY OR
THE REMOVAL OF INDIAN CHILDREN FROM THE FAMILY.

Of greater importance to finding that the IWCA did not
apply was the court's finding that there was no Indian family
to breakup. Finding
1995.

of

Facts,

Order

and

Decree,

2, June 29,

The facts supporting this finding were:
1) The children never resided on the reservation,
2) The father did not support the children.
3) The children always resided with the non-Indian
mother.
4) There had been no effort by either parent to
raise the children in an Indian cultural setting.
5) The children did not consider themselves to be
Indians and knew very little about Indian ways.
There was a great deal of testimony about Indian culture

and values.

See,

Testimony

of Mr. Wise,

on 11/30/94 and 12/1/94, at 174
clear

a number

of

import

- 194.

facts.

Transcript of Hearing
This testimony made

First, Mr.

Coando

never

attempted to raise the children in the Indian way. Second, Mr.
Wise testified that an abusive person Like Mr. Coando, could

20

not pass on properly the oral traditions necessary to raise a
family in the Indian way. Transcript of Hearing on 11/30/94
and 12/1/94 at 189-90.
into

Third, a person could not be forced
Id.

the Indian culture.

at 187-89.

And

fourth, the
Id.

children never lived in a native American setting.

at

173-174.
Because the whole purpose of the ICWA is to prevent the
destruction

of

Indian culture

and way of

life, as well

as

prevent courts from applying standards that do not apply to a
traditional

Indian

family

environment,

the

purpose

fairly be applied where no such environment exists.

cannot
Further,

the children are not being removed from their family setting
at all.
Section

This is a key factor in the policy behind the act.
1902 establishes

"minimum

federal

standards

for the

removal of Indian children from their families".

25 USCS §

1902.

where

These

children

are

governmental

standards
not

do

being

agency.

See,

not

rightfully

removed
K.E.

from
v.

State

apply

their
of

family
Utah,

the

by

a

285 Utah

Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah App. 1996).
C.

In K.E.
App.

EXPERT TESTIMONY IS ONLY REQUIRED IN CASES
WHERE THE STATE IS SEEKING TO REMOVE CHILDREN
FROM AN INDIAN FAMILY.
v.

State

of

Utah,

285 Utah Adv. Rep. 25

(Utah

1996), this Court noted that "the ICWA only requires the

State to present qualified expert testimony on the issue of
whether serious harm to the Indian child is likely to occur if
21

the child is not removed from the home."
re

C.W.,

479 N.W.2d 105, 111

Id.

at 27, citing

(Neb. 1992).

In

The children were

not being removed from the home, nor were they in the custody
of the appellant.
Appellant

argues

that

a natural parent

is required

to

provide expert testimony "that continued custody of the child
by

the

parent

or

Indian

custodian

is

likely

to

result

in

serious emotional or physical damage to the child." 25 USCS §
1912(f).

Assuming that this requirement applies in the case

at hand, the requirement was met.

Mr. Augustus testified that

he was a licensed Clinical Social Worker with a Masters
Sociology and a Masters in Social Work.

in

Further, he had been

working in the field since 1970, primarily with children and
families. Transcript of Hearing on 11/30/94 and 12/1/94, at 23.

Mr. Augustus was qualified to be an expert and testified

that

the

time

determine
result
Id.

that

he

spent

serious

with

the

emotional

children
or

was

physical

adequate
damage

if Mr. Coando's parental rights were not

at 205-06, 210.

to

would

terminated.

(There are no time requirements for such

interviews) The fact that Mr. Augustus had little experience
with the ICWA is irrelevant, since he was not testifying as a
legal

expert.

Mr.

Augustus'

expertise

was

counselor, who deals with people, not statutes.
need

to be versed

This Court

in the

has noted

that

that

of

a

Expert do not

ICWA nor even in Indian culture.
"professionals

22

having

substantial

education and experience in child welfare might well qualify
as expert witnesses under ICWA, even though their experience
In K.E.

with Indians is limited."

In

the

v.

State

of

Utah,

at 27.

a)

MR. AUGUSTUS SATISFIED THE QUALIFICATIONS
OF AN EXPERT WITNESS.

Matter

of M.E.M. , 635 P.2d 1313 (Mont. 1981), used

the Department of Interior Guidelines to aid it in determining
who

qualified

Supreme

as

Court

an

felt

expert
that

under
this

the

was

ICWA.

The

appropriate

Montana
since

a

"qualified expert witness" is not defined under the act and
because the Court felt that the "guidelines comport with the
spirit of the ICWA."
the

three

Augustus.

examples
Such

an

In

the

Matter

of M.E.M. , at

cited,

the

third

is

expert

is described

.

applicable
as

a

Of

to Mr.

"professional

person having substantial education and experience in the area
of his or her specialty."

Id.;

K.E.

v.

State

of

Utah,

at 27.

Proper foundation was laid to qualify Mr. Augustus under this
category and no objection was made.
6.

THE STANDARD OF PROOF THAT APPLIES
TO THIS CASE IS
THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING STANDARD APPLICABLE
IN
STATE COURT.
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT ONLY APPLIES
TO EXPERT TESTIMONY IN STATE REMOVAL CASES.

The standards of proof that apply to this case are clear
and convincing.
that

there was

In K.E.

v.

State

of

Utah,

this court found

a "dual burden of proof" wherein

federal requirements are satisfied separately. K.E.
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state
v.

and
State

of

Utah,

at 26-27.

The burden of "beyond a reasonable doubt"

is employed only in relation to expert testimony as to harm to
the child and then only in termination cases where the child
Id.}

is being removed from the home.

25 USCS § 1912(f).

All

other aspects are governed by the state standards of clear and
convincing.

However,

removed

the

from

because

home,

there

the
is

children
no

need

are
for

not
the

being
expert

testimony.
Even

assuming

that

expert

testimony

was

required

the

testimony was sufficient to make a finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that failure to remove the children from the "custody"
of the father "would result in serious emotional damage" to
the children.

The was evidence that Mr. Coando subjected the

children

to

emotional

11/30/94

and

12/1/94,

failed

to

intoxicated

distress.
205-206.

support: his
and

Transcript
That

children.

abusive

when

he

he

That
was

of

had
he

at

Hearing

neglected
was

home.

physically abused his wife if front of the children.

on
and

constantly
That

he

And that

the only respite in this behavior was when he was in prison.
Id.,

generally.
There was adequate evidence to support a finding

clear and convincing.

under

The evidence supported a finding that

would allow termination of parental rights under five of the
seven grounds listed in U.C.A. § 78-3a-407.
to

support

the

children.

He

24

was

found

The father failed
to

be

unfit

or

incompetent to care for the children.
Order

and Decree,

periods of time.
See,

Id.

at 5.

at 4.
Id.

Findings

of

Facts,

He had been incarcerated for long

at 3.

Failure of parental adjustment.

The father had made only token efforts to

support the children, to prevent neglect, to eliminate risk of
serious physical, mental or emotional abuse of the children.
Id at 3.

Or to avoid being an unfit parent.

Id at 4.

Each

of these findings taken by themselves constitute grounds for
termination.

U.C.A.

§ 78-3a-408.

Taken

they more

than

satisfy burden of proof required for termination.
7.

THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM ACTED PROPERLY AND ANY ACTIONS
TAKEN BY HIM ABE NOT GROUNDS FOR

APPEAL.

The Guardian ad Litem was appointed pursuant to U.C.A. §
55-16-7.

Appointment was justified due to the violent and

abusive history of Mr. Coando, his failure to support the
children, his neglect

of the children, and the

children had of their father.

fears the

The Guardian ad Litem has the

duty to represent the best interests of the minor children.
He does not have the duty to look after the parent's best
interest or that of the tribe.

The main point of Appellant's

argument is that Mr. Austin did not agree with Mr. Coando.
This is not grounds for appeal.
Appellant argues that because Mr. Austin decided it was
necessary

to

take

a more

active

role

than

intended, that this is somehow prejudicial.

25

he

at

first

Appellant argues

that

Mr.

Coando

Appellant

felt

complains

bad.

that

Brief

the

of

questions

Appellant,

at

34.

asked by Mr. Austin

were "combative". Id

at 32.

The question Appellant complains

of

by

Judge,

was

not

because

allowed

it was

not

the

allowed.

and

However,

is

not

prejudicial

the

point

that

the

Guardian ad Litem was bringing out was that Mr. Coando

had

never attempted to raise his children in the Indian way.
of this is grounds for appeal.

None

An appeal cannot be made on

the grounds that the other attorney did not agree with you, or
that your client felt bad as a result.
Appellant complains that Mr. Austin asked that Mr. Coando
be barred from the court room.
Coando had
disrupted
trial,

The motion was made after Mr.

left the courtroom.
court

causing

proceedings
numerous

Mr. Coando had

throughout

the

See,

delays.

be

necessary

for

Mr.

Coando

to

course

Record

During one such outburst apellant's attorney
would

continually
the

generally.

stated

remain

of

that it

outside

the

courtroom if the case was to proceed. Transcript of Hearing on
11/30/94

and

12/1/94,

at

12-13.

The

motion,

however,

was

denied.

The fact that a party makes such a motion, so that he

can

through

get

his

closing

arguments,

is not

grounds

for

appeal, especially where the motion is denied.
The appellant is unhappy that the Guardian ad Litem took
the position that the children were not living as part of the
Indian

culture, and

should not be

26

forced

to do

so

against

their wishes. This was

the position

taken by

the

tribe

as

well. Appellant takes exception with statements by Mr. Austin
during closing argument that race was not an issue, but that
"[w]hat is important is culture identity."
at 32.

Brief of Appellant

The appellant quotes most of this particular statement

in its brief.

Brief of Appellant at 33.

However, appellant

leaves off the last sentence, where Mr. Austin states that,
the children's cultural setting "may change in the future, but
like Mr. Wise

said,

that

is to be - that

should be

their

decision and no one else's. Transcript of Hearing on 11/30/94
and 12/1/94, at 312.
interest

of

the

Tribe

The point being, once again, that the
is

in

maintaining

its

society, but it cannot be forced upon anyone.

culture

and

The Guardian ad

Litem never decided that the children had no interest in being
Indian (Brief of Appellant at 34), but rather agreed with the
Tribe

that

interest

it must be

in

these

the children's decision. The

matters

could

best

be

realized

Tribe's
if

the

negative influence of the father were not present to dissuade
the children.
Appellant also argues that the Guardian ad Litem did not
draft a list of issues to be addressed in a psychological exam
before taking the children to Ute Tribal Psychologist.
is

simply

not

true.

The

issues

were

determined

by

This
the

Juvenile Court, and the Guardian ad Litem was to provide a
background

statement.

The

fact

27

that

the

Guardian

ad

Litem

acted upon

the

findings of the psychologist

to protect

child and terminate visitation, is not grounds for appeal.
was

the

duty

of

the

Guardian

ad

Litem,

as

attorney, to represent their best interests.

the

the
It

children's

If in looking

after the best interest of his clients the Mr. Austin "became
an advocate

against Mr. Coando"

then this was appropriate.

(Brief of Appellant

at 35)

And being appropriate, could not

have "created undue bias and prejudice against Mr. Coando in
the mind of Court."

Id.

If anyone has acted unethically it

is the attorney for the appellant for bringing such frivolous
claims, based only on the fact that someone disagreed with the
appellant.
CONCLUSION
The Court should uphold the ruling of the Juvenile Court
terminating the parental right of Mr. Coando.
Court did not overrule itself.
not apply

in the case at hand.

Sections 1912

The

Juvenile

(d) and

(f) do

Nor does the ICWA require

expert testimony and proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the
harm to the children where the children are not being removed
from the home nor from an Indian family.

Even if such proof

were required, the evidence was sufficient to support such a
finding.

Nor were the actions of the Guardian ad Litem in an

adversarial

proceeding

prejudicial.

The

Court,

therefore, affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

28

should

DATED: this >"JY day of July, 1996.
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I certify that on £?_
day of July, 1996, a true and
accurate copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage
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Cindy Barton-Coombs
Attorney for Appellant
193 North State Street
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Cleave J. Hatch
Guardian ad Litem
363 East Main, 2nd Floor
Vernal, Utah 84078
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APPENDIX
Memorandum Decision, July 5, 1994
Finding

of

Facts,

Order

and Decree,

2, June 29, 1995

Indian Child Welfare Act

IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Interest of:
David Alan Coando
Sky Deona Coando
Paul Dean Coando

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Comes now the Court in the above entitled matter and
hereby rules on the jurisdictional Motion to Stay
Proceeding and Transfer to the Tribal Court filed oy
Patrick D. Coando on November 8, 1993, and the
jurisdictional Motion for Transfer of Jurisdiction filed
by Mr. John C. Schumacher on behalf of the Eastern
Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River Reservation in Fort
Washakie, Wyoming. The Court held hearings on November
18, 1993 and March 3, 1994 and heard proffers and argument
form counsel. Present at the hearing on November 18,
1993, was Mr. John Beaslin representing Debra Jean ^
Robertson and Mr. Dixon Hindley representing Patrick
Coando. Present at the hearing held on March 3, 1994, was
Mr. Jose Luis Trujillo and Mr. John C. Schumacher
representing the Eastern Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River
Reservation, Mr. Larry A. Steele, Guardian Ad Litem, Mr.
Patrick A. Coando who was represented by his attorney of
record, Dixon D. Hindley, and Debra Jean Robertson, who
was represented by her attorney of record, Mr. John C.
Beaslin. The Court considered the Memorandums of Law and
Points of Authority filed by all parties, and being fully
advised in the premises, now makes the following order:
1. That counsel for the parties have made the
following stipulate on:
a. That the above named minors are Indian
children, within the meaning of the Indian
Child Welfare Act, 25 United States Code,
Section 1901, et seq. 1978.

b. That the above named minors are not
domiciled on the reservation and thereby
Section 1911 (b) of the Act applies to this
proceeding.
c. That the burden of proof is on Debra Jean
Robertson, the party seeking termination of
parental rights, to show good cause why
this matter should not be transferred to
the Tribal Court.
2. That the State Court pursuant to Section 1911 (b)
of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 USCS) is required to
transfer a proceeding for the termination of parental
rights to an Indian child not domiciled within the
reservation to the Indian child's Tribe in the absence of
good cause to the contrary and absent objection by either
parent.
3. That Debra Jean Robertson, the non-Indian natural
mother and legal custodian of the above-named children,
objects to the transfer of jurisdiction of this matter to
the Tribal Court on the ground that she and the children
are sufficiently removed form the Tribe and its ways to
justify giving jurisdiction over to a non-Indian Court.
Mrs. Robertson has never resided on the reservation and
neither have the children's. The only contact the
children have had with their Indian father has been
minimal and the children perceive that contact to be a
negative experience.
4. That pursuant to the Bureau of Indian Affairs
Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody
Proceedings, section C2, the Indian Child Welfare Act
"gives the parents and the Tribal Court of the Indian
child's tribe an absolute veto over transfers, and there
is no need for any adversary proceeding if the parents or
the Tribal Court opposes transfer."
5. That it is not necessary for this Court to
determine whether an objection by one parent to the
transfer of jurisdiction to the Tribal Court is an
absolute veto to the application of the Indian Child
Welfare Act because good cause exists to retain this
matter in the Eighth District Juvenile Court.
6. That even though the Court is not required to
determine whether one parent's objection to the transfer

Z

of jurisdiction to the Tribal Court is an absolute veto to
the transfer, the plain meaning of the Indian Child
Welfare Act provides that the Court consider an objection
by either parent. In the least the Act makes transfer of
jurisdiction to a Tribal Court discretionary with the
State Court when there is an objection to the transfer by
either parent.
7. That pursuant to the Bureau of Indian Affairs
Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody
Proceedings section C2 and C3, the following constitutes
"good cause to the contrary";
a. The Indian child is over 12 years of age
and objects to the transfer.
b. The evidence necessary to decide the case
could not be adequately presented to the
Tribal Court without undo hardship to the
parties or the witnesses.
8. That David Allen Coando and Paul Dean Coando are
twin boys, 14 years of age, who object to the transfer of
jurisdiction to the Tribal Court. These boys have
personal memories of their father, Patrick D. Coando,
beating their mother on a number of occasions. They are
extremely fearful of their father. They remember their
father taking them from the custody of their mother and
without her knowledge or permission to the Indian
reservation where he told they would never see their
mother again. Although the boys views may have been
colored by the fears and opinions of their mother, their
determination is clearly based on their experiences and
observations with their father and is not merely a
reflection of their mother's objection. To require them
to travel at this time to the Indian reservation for
Tribal Court would be detrimental to their physical and
emotional well-being and not in their best interest. The
boys perceive that they are not safe on the reservation.
9. That Sky Deona Coando, the 7 year old daughter of
the parties, objects to the transfer of jurisdiction of
this matter to the Tribal Court based upon personal
memories and nightmares she has of an occasion when her
father physically attacked her mother in her presence.
Sky was knocked down during the struggle, and her father
tried to take her away from her mother. To require Sky to
travel to the reservation at this time would be seriously
detrimental to her emotional stability because she
perceives that she is not safe on the reservation.

3

10. That good cause exists to retain this case in the
state Court because the evidence necessary to decide this
case could not be adequately presented in the Tribal Court
without undo hardship to the parties or the witnesses. In
this case the Tribal Court of the Eastern Shoshone Tribe
of the Wind River Reservation is 5 hours driving time from
Vernal, Utah, the home of the Petitioners. The parties
and minor children have resided primarily in Vernal, Utah
and Roosevelt, Utah and the witnesses required for the
termination hearing primarily reside in the Vernal and
Roosevelt area. Many of the witnesses are older and an
undo hardship will be placed upon them to travel to the
Tribal Court in Wyoming.
11. That the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 USCS) was
enacted to address congressional findings set forth in
section 1901 in paragraph four "that an alarmingly high
percentage of Indian families are broken up by the
removal, often unwarranted, of their children by
non-Tribal public and private agencies, and that an
alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in
non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions."
12. That the above entitled matter is a dispute
between the natural parents of the above named three minor
children. There is no state or private agency seeking to
remove the Indian children from their Indian home. The
issue of termination of parental rights is between the
natural parents and custody of the children will remain
with a natural parent.
13. That the Court must weigh the interests of the
Indian Tribe pertaining to its children and its
sovereignty with those of the parents, in this case each
parent individually, and the interests of the children.
The ICWA gives parents an opportunity to object to the
transfer of the jurisdiction to the Tribal Court, and that
Act gives parties the opportunity to show "good cause" why
jurisdiction should not be transferred. Upon balancing
these competing interests, this Court finds that while
this matter comes within the ICWA pursuant to section 1911
(b) (action to terminate parental rights), the controversy
is between two parents and does not involve the breakup of
Indian families by the removal of Indian children by
non-Tribal public and private agencies or the placement of
the children in non-Indian foster or adoptive homes. Good
cause exists to retain the matter in the State Court. The
custodial parent objects to the transfer, and this Court
finds that it does not run

counter to the intent of the ICWA to retain jurisdiction
in the State Court.

Dated this July 5, 1994
BY THE COURT:
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8 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 623
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

JOHN BEASLIN,
ATTORNEY FOR DEBRA ROBERTSON
185 NORTH VERNAL AVE SUITE 1
VERNAL UT 84078

JOSE LUIS TRUJILLO ESQ
8 E BROADWAY, SUITE 73 5
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

LARRY A STEELE
GUARDIAN AD LITEM
319 WEST 100 SOUTH
VERNAL UT 84078

JOHN C SCHUMACHER
ATTORNEY FOR EASTERN SHOSHONE TRIBE
P O BOX 748
FORT WASHAKIE WY 82514

JUVENILE COURT

^

vy

EIGHTH DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF
Coando, David Alan 12-02-79
Coando, Paul Dean 12-02-79
Coando, Sky Deona 04-15-87
Children under 18 years of age

(
(

FINDING OF FACTS
ORDER AND DECREE

(
(
(

CASE NO. 856709
856706
856707

(

Judge Jeril B. Wilson

The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Judge Jeril B. Wilson for trial
on November 30th and December 1st 1994. The Petitioner, Debra Robertson was present,
and was represented by counsel, John C. Beaslin; the Defendant Patrick Coando was present,
and was represented by counsel, Cindy Barton-Coombs; the Eastern Shoshone Tribe was
represented by counsel, John C. Schumacher; the children were represented by Eugene
Austin, Guardian ad Litem. The Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses and
having taken the matter under advisement now enters the following Findings of Fact,
Conclusion of Law and Order, based upon the law; the exhibits, the briefs that were
submitted, and the testimony given.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This court has reconsidered the March 23, 1994 order of Judge Lindsay, issued prior

to the conclusion of the case, and finds that the children have spent their entire lives with
their custodial mother with frequent aid from relatives, and have had minimal contact with
their natural father.
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The children have no real attachment to nor affection for their Indian father and

members of his family.
3.

There is no existing Indian family unit or environment from which the children are

being removed.
4.

The Indian father has not maintained custody of the children and the mother is

non-Indian.
5.

Even though the children are certified with the Eastern Shoshone Tribe as enrolled

members, this action is not for the removal of Indian children from an existing Indian family
unit, and the termination of Mr. Coando's parental rights will not result in the break-up of
an Indian family.
6.

The specific facts of this case are not within the scope of Congress intent in

establishing the Indian Child Welfare Act. Therefore, the court concludes that the legal and
procedural standards of the Indian Child Welfare Act do not apply in this case.
7.

That these findings are convincing grounds to reconsider the previous order of Judge

Lindsay dated March 23, 1994 to correct clear error and prevent manifest injustice.
TERMINATION OF FATHER PARENTAL RIGHTS
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence:
1.

David Allen Coando and Paul Dean Coando were born December 2, 1979

and Sky Deona Coando was born April 15, 1987. They are the natural children of
Debra Robertson and Patrick Coando.
2.

Debra Robertson and Patrick Coando were married in 1985 or 1986 and were

'"
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divorced August 15, 1989. The divorce decree gave custody of the 3 children to
Debra Robertson.
3.

Mr. Coando has been incarcerated three times since the birth of the twins, David

and Paul most recently from July 10, 1990 to July 24, 1994 as a result of a conviction of
felony assault against Mrs. Robertson. Which fact is evidence of grounds for termination
pursuant to 78-3a-408 (2)(e) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
4.

On July 10, 1990 Mr. Coando broke into Mrs. Robertson's home and assaulted her

by hitting and kicking her. When she tried to flee Mr. Coando grabbed ahold of her hair
and yanked her back into the house. She tried to flee a second time and Mr. Coando caught
up with her and knocked her to the road and dragged her back into the house again.
Sky, age three, witnessed this assault and was knocked down during it. Mrs. Robertson
then ran to a neighbor for help and called 911. Mr. Coando placed Sky in his car and was
attempting to leave when the police arrived.
5.

Mr. Coando has failed to provide support for the children. Therefore the Court finds

that Mr. Coando has failed to support his children pursuant to 78-3a-407(6)(a) Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended.
6.

Mr. Conado has frequently been inebriated, sometimes in the presence of the

children.
7.

On one occasion in 1979 Mr. Coando was tending the twins, David and Paul, and

Mrs. Robertson returned to find Mr. Coando passed out from drinking and a bag of
marijuana on the living room floor. Such actions constitute a failure to prevent the neglect
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of the children,, pursuant to 78-3a-407(6)(b) Utah code Annotated 1953, as amended. The
Court further finds that this event was but a sampling from the testimony offered evidencing
a habitual or excessive use of intoxication liquor, controlled substances, and dangerous
drugs, to the extent that Mr. Coando would be rendered unable to care for the child,
pursuant to 78-3a-408 (2)(c) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
8.

Throughout their relationship, on numerous occasion, Mr. Coando would threaten

Mrs. Robertson with physical harm including threatening to kill her.
9.

Frequently Mr. Coando would take part of Mrs. Robertson's paychecks by

threatening her with physical harm,
10.

Frequently Mr. Coando would threaten Mrs. Robertson with taking the children and

that she would never see them again.
11.

Mr. Coando has a history of violent behavior.

12.

Mr. Coando is unfit or incompetent to parent the children which fact is seriously

detrimental to the children, in that he has made no more than token efforts to support or
communicate with the children, to prevent neglect of the children, to eliminate the risk of
serious physical, mental, or emotional abuse of the children, or to avoid being an unfit
parent, which constitutes grounds for termination of parental rights under 78-3a-407 (6)
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
13.

It is in the best interest and welfare of the children that Mr. Coando's rights

be terminated.
14.

Mr. Coando has for many years put his own needs and welfare above that
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of his children.
15.

There exists no parent/child relationship between Mr. Coando and the children.

16.

The children have bonded with D.Ray Robertson who married their mother January

11, 1990.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
1.

The parental rights of Patrick Coando, natural father to the children should be

terminated pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-3a-407 and 408.
2.

It is in the best interest of there children that the parental rights of their natural

father Patrick Coando be terminated.
ORDER
1.

The legal and procedural standards of the Indian Child Welfare Act do not apply

in this case.
2.

The Eastern Shoshone Tribe's motion to dismiss is hereby denied and judgement is

rendered terminating the parental rights of Patrick Coando, natural
father to the children.
DATED this

^£Q ^~~

day oC\i^l

1995.

Juvenile Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ,7 V, day of June, 1995, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER was mailed, postage fully pre-paid, the
following:
Cindy Barton-Coombs, Esq.
193 North State Street
P.O. Box 7313
Roosevelt, Utah 84066

Patrick D. Coando
P.O. Box 1201
Ft. Washakie, Wy. 82514

John Beaslin, Esq.
185 North Vernal Ave
Vernal, Utah 84078

John Schumacher, Esq.
P.O. Box 748
Ft. Washakie, Wy. 82514-0748

Cleve J. Hatch
Guardian ad Litem
363 East Main, 2nd Floor
Vernal, Utah 84078
Xl5eputy Court Clerk
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1919.
1920.
1921.
1922.
1923.

(a) Petition; suitable plan; approval by Secretary
(b) Criteria applicable to consideration by Secretary; partial retrocession
(c) Approval of petition; publication in Federal Register; notice;
reassumption period; correction of causes for disapproval
(d) Pending actions or proceedings unaffected
Agreements between states and Indian tribes
(a) Subject coverage
(b) Revocation; notice; actions or proceedings unaffected
Improper removal of child from custody; declination of jurisdiction;
forthwith return of child: danger exception
Higher State or Federal standard applicable to protect rights of
parent or Indian custodian of Indian child
Emergency removal or placement of child; termination; appropriate
action
Effective date
INDIAN CHILD AND FAMILY PROGRAMS

1931. Grants for on or near reservation programs and child welfare codes
(a) Statement of purpose; scope of programs
(b) Non-Federal matching funds for related Social Security or other
Federal financial assistance programs; assistance for such programs unaffected; State licensing or approval for qualification
for assistance under federally assisted program
1932. Grants for off-reservation programs for additional services
1933. Funds for on and off reservation programs
(a) Appropriated funds for similar programs of Department of Health
and Human Services; appropriation in advance for payments
(b) Appropriation authorization under 25 USCS § 13
1934. "Indian" defined for certain purposes
RECORDKEEPING, INFORMATION AVAILABILITY, AND
TIMETABLES
1951.

Information availability to and disclosure by Secretary
(a) Copy of final decree or order; other information; anonymity
affidavit; exemption from 5 USCS § 552
(b) Disclosure of information for enrollment of Indian child in tribe
or for determination of member rights or benefits; certification
of entitlement to enrollment
1952. Rules and regulations
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
1961. Education; day schools; report to congressional committees; particular consideration of elementary grade facilities
1962. [Omitted]
1963. Severability of provisions
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CROSS REFERENCES
This chapter is referred to in 25 USCS § 1727.

§ 1901.

Congressional findings

Recognizing the special relationship between the United States and the
Indian tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility to Indian
people, the Congress finds—
(1) that clause 3, section 8, article I of the United States Constitution
[USCS Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl 3] provides that "The Congress shall
have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . with Indian tribes'* and,
through this and other constitutional authority, Congress has plenary
power over Indian affairs;
(2) that Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general course of
dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility for the
protection and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources;
(3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence
and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the United
States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who
are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe;
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up
by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by
nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high
percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive
homes and institutions; and
(5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian
child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies,
have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian
people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian
communities and families.
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, § 2, 92 Stat. 3069.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Short titles:
Act Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, § 1, 92 Stat. 3069, provided: 'This Act
[25 USCS §§1901 et seq.] may be cited as the 'Indian Child Welfare
Act of 19787'.
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5 U S C S § 1901
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
Congress, in enacting Indian Child Welfare
<i of 1978 (25 USCS §§ 1901 et seq.) has
vcitically recognized importance of allowing
ibal courts to assume full responsibility for
ucement of Indian children in foster care and
loptive homes, by granting Indian tribes excluve jurisdiction over such proceedings. Johnson
Frederick (1979, DC ND) 467 F Supp 956.

Indian Child Welfare Act (25 USCS §§1901
et seq) is not unconstitutional under equal protection clause, since protection of integrity of
Indian families is permissible goal that is rationally related to fulfillment of Congress' unique
guardianship obligation toward Indians. Re Application of Angus (1982) 60 Or App 546, 655
P2d 208

1902. Congressional declaration of policy
fhe Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect
-he best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum
federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families
and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will
eflect the unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance
) Indian tribes in the operation of child and family service programs.
Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, § 3, 92 Stat. 3069.)
1903. Definitions
•or the purposes of this Act [25 USCS §§ 1901 et seq.], except as may be
pecifically provided otherwise, the term—
(1) "child custody proceeding*' shall mean and include—
(i) "foster care placement" which shall mean any action removing an
Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary
placement in a foster home or institution or the home of a guardian
or conservator where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have the
child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been
terminated;
(ii) "termination of parental rights" which shall mean any action
resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship;
(iii) "preadoptive placement" which shall mean the temporary placement of an Indian child in a foster home or institution after the
termination of parental rights, but prior to or in lieu of adoptive
placement; and
(iv) "adoptive placement" which shall mean the permanent placement
of an Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting in a
final decree of adoption.
Such term or terms shall not include a placement based upon an act
which, if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon an
award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one of the parents.
(2) "extended family member" shall be as defined by the law or custom
of the Indian child's tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom, shall
be a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian
690
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child's grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or
sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent;
(3) "Indian" means any person who is a member of an Indian tribe, or
who is an Alaska Native and a member of a Regional Corporation as
defined in section 7 of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85
Stat. 688, 689) [43 USCS § 1606];
(4) "Indian child" means any unmarried person who is under age
eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible
for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe;
(5) "Indian child's tribe" means (a) the Indian tribe in which an Indian
child is a member or eligible for membership or (b), in the case of an
Indian child who is a member of or eligible for membership in more
than one tribe, the Indian tribe with which the Indian child has the
more significant contacts;
(6) "Indian custodian" means any Indian person who has legal custody
of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State law or to
whom temporary physical care, custody, and control has been transferred by the parent of such child;
(7) "Indian organization" means any group, association, partnership,
corporation, or other legal entity owned or controlled by Indians, or a
majority of whose members are Indians;
(8) "Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other
organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the
services provided to Indians by the Secretary because of their status as
Indians, including any Alaska Native village as defined in section 3(c) of
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688, 689), as
amended [42 USCS § 1602(c)];
(9) "parent" means any biological parent or parents of an Indian child
or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child,
including adoptions under tribal law or custom. It does not include the
unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established;
(10) "reservation" means Indian country as defined in section 1151 of
title 18, United States Code [18 USCS §1151] and any lands, not
covered under such section, title to which is either held by the United
States in trust for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by
any Indian tribe or individual subject to a restriction by the United
States against alienation;
(11) "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Interior; and
(12) "tribal court" means a court with jurisdiction over child custody
proceedings and which is either a Court of Indian Offenses, a court
established and operated under the code or custom of an Indian tribe, or
any other administrative body of a tribe which is vested with authority
over child custody proceedings.
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, §4, 92 Stat. 3069.)
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iesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian
ustodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
hild.
Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 102, 92 Stat. 3071.)
CROSS REFERENCES
This section is referred to in 25 USCS §§ 1914, 1916.
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
If party wishes to defeat biological parent's
ctition for return of custody, he or she must
•rove that such return is not in child's best
merest by showing (1) that remedial and rehauhtative programs designed to prevent breakup
I Indian family had been implemented without
access and (2) that such return of custody is
kely to result in serious harm to child; serious
arm element must be proved beyond reasonable
oubt and must be established by testimony of
,uahfied expert witnesses. A B M . v M.H. (1982,
vlaska) 651 P2d 1170.
Parental rights in Indian child pursuant to
udian Child Welfare Act (25 USCS §§1901 et
q ) may not be terminated on basis of finding
Mat evidence was clear and convincing that
ontmued custody would likely result in severe
•notional and physical damage to child; the Act

j 1913.

requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Re H.
(1980, SD) 299 NW2d 812, later app (SD) 316
NW2d 650.
Under Indian Child Welfare Act (25 USCS
§§ 1901 et seq.), dependency and neglect must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence. People
In Interest of S. R. (1982, SD) 323 NW2d 885.
Expert witness requirement of 25 USCS
§ 1912(0 was fulfilled by testimony of social
worker with 4 years experience who has BA
degree in social work and has had contact with
Indians on regular basis, and testimony of director of children's shelter and resource center who
has BS degree in social work and one year
towards her master's degree, since approximately
30 percent of children utilizing shelter are Indians. Matter of K. A. B. E. (1982, SD) 325
NW2d 840.

Parental rights; voluntary termination

a) Consent; record; certification matters; invalid consents. Where any
parent or Indian custodian voluntarily consents to a foster care placement
>r to termination of parental rights, such consent shall not be valid unless
xecuted in writing and recorded before a judge of a court of competent
urisdiction and accompanied by the presiding judge's certificate that the
erms and consequences of the consent were fully explained in detail and
sere fully understood by the parent or Indian custodian. The court shall
ilso certify that either the parent or Indian custodian fully understood the
xplanation in English or that it was interpreted into a language that the
>arent or Indian custodian understood. Any consent given prior to, or
v ithin ten days after, birth of the Indian child shall not be valid.
b) Foster care placement; withdrawal of consent. Any parent or Indian
ustodian may withdraw consent to a foster care placement under State
aw at any time and, upon such withdrawal, the child shall be returned to
he parent or Indian custodian.
c) Voluntary termination of parental rights or adoptive placement; withIrawal of consent; return of custody. In any voluntary proceeding for
ermination of parental rights to, or adoptive placement of, an Indian
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child, the consent of the parent may be withdrawn for any reason at any
time prior to the entry of a final decree of termination or adoption, as the
case may be, and the child shall be returned to the parent.
(d) Collateral attack; vacation of decree and return of custody; limitations.
After the entry of a final decree of adoption of an Indian child in any State
court, the parent may withdraw consent thereto upon the grounds that
consent was obtained through fraud or duress and may petition the court
to vacate such decree. Upon a finding that such consent was obtained
through fraud or duress, the court shall vacate such decree and return the
child to the parent. No adoption which has been effective for at least two
years may be invalidated under the provisions of this subsection unless
otherwise permitted under State law.
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 103, 92 Stat. 3072.)
CROSS REFERENCES
This section is referred to in 25 USCS § 1914.
§ 1914. Petition to court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate
action upon showing of certain violations
Any Indian child who is the subject of any action for foster care placement
or termination of parental rights under State law, any parent or Indian
custodian from whose custody such child was removed, and the Indian
child's tribe may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate
such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of
sections 101, 102, and 103 of this Act [25 USCS §§ 1911, 1912, 1913].
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 104, 92 Stat. 3072.)
§ 1915.

Placement of Indian children

(a) Adoptive placements; preferences. In any adoptive placement of an
Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of
good cause to the contrary, to a placement with
(1) a member of the child's extended family;
(2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or
(3) other Indian families.
(b) Foster care or preadoptive placements; criteria; preferences. Any child
accepted for foster care or preadoptive placement shall be placed in the
least restrictive setting which most approximates a family and in which his
special needs, if any, may be met. The child shall also be placed within
reasonable proximity to his or her home, taking into account any special
needs of the child. In any foster care or preadoptive placement, a prefer- ^P
ence shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a
^
placement with—
(i) a member of the Indian child's extended family;
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(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child's
tribe;
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized nonIndian licensing authority; or
(iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated
by an Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the
Indian child's needs.
(c) Tribal resolution for different order of preference; personal preference
considered; anonymity in application of preferences. In the case of a
placement under subsection (a) or (b) of this section, if the Indian child's
tribe shall establish a different order of preference by resolution, the agency
or court effecting the placement shall follow such order so long as the
placement is the least restrictive setting appropriate to the particular needs
of the child, as provided in subsection (b) of this section. Where appropriate, the preference of the Indian child or parent shall be considered:
Provided, That where a consenting parent evidences a desire for anonymity, the court or agency shall give weight to such desire in applying the
preferences.
(d) Social and cultural standards applicable. The standards to be applied in
meeting the preference requirements of this section shall be the prevailing
social and cultural standards of the Indian community in which the parent
or extended family resides or with which the parent or extended family
members maintain social and cultural ties.
(e) Record of placement; availability. A record of each such placement,
under State law, of an Indian child shall be maintained by the State in
which the placement was made, evidencing the efforts to comply with the
order of preference specified in this section. Such record shall be made
available at any time upon the request of the Secretary or the Indian
child's tribe.
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 105, 92 Stat. 3073.)

§ 1916. Return of custody
(a) Petition; best interests of child. Notwithstanding State law to the
contrary, whenever a final decree of adoption of an Indian child has been
vacated or set aside or the adoptive parents voluntarily consent to the
termination of their parental rights to the child, a biological parent or prior
Indian custodian may petition for return of custody and the court shall
grant such petition unless there is a showing, in a proceeding subject to the
provisions of section 102 of this Act [25 USCS § 1912], that such return of
custody is not in the best interests of the child.
(b) Removal from foster care home; placement procedure. Whenever an
Indian child is removed from a foster care home or institution for the
purpose of further foster care, preadoptive, or adoptive placement, such
placement shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Act [25 USCS
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§§ 1901 et seq.], except in the case where an Indian child is being returned
to the parent or Indian custodian from whose custody the child was
originally removed.
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 106, 92 Stat. 3073.)
§ 1917. Tribal affiliation information and other information for
protection of rights from tribal relationship; application of subject of
adoptive placement; disclosure by court
Upon application by an Indian individual who has reached the age ol
eighteen and who was the subject of an adoptive placement, the court
which entered the final decree shall inform such individual of. the tribal
affiliation, if any, of the individual's biological parents and provide such
other information as may be necessary to protect any rights flowing from
the individual's tribal relationship.
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 107, 92 Stat. 3073.)
§ 1918.
ings

Reassumption of jurisdiction over child custody proceed-

(a) Petition; suitable plan; approval by Secretary. Any Indian tribe which
became subject to State jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of the Act
of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as amended by title IV of the Act of
April 11, 1968 (82 Stat. 73, 78), or pursuant to any other Federal law, may
reassume jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. Before any Indian
tribe may reassume jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings,
such tribe shall present to the Secretary for approval a petition to reassume
such jurisdiction which includes a suitable plan to exercise such jurisdiction.
(b) Criteria applicable to consideration by Secretary; partial retrocession.
(1) In considering the petition and feasibility of the plan of a tribe under
subsection (a), the Secretary may consider, among other things:
(i) whether or not the tribe maintains a membership roll or alternative
provision for clearly identifying the persons who will be affected by
the reassumption of jurisdiction by the tribe;
(ii) the size of the reservation or former reservation area which will be
affected by retrocession and reassumption of jurisdiction by the tribe;
(iii) the population base of the tribe, or distribution of the population
in homogeneous communities or geographic areas; and
(iv) the feasibility of the plan in cases of multitribal occupation of a
single reservation or geographic area.
(2) In those cases where the Secretary determines that the jurisdictional
provisions of section 101(a) of this Act [25 USCS § 1911(a)] are not
feasible, he is authorized to accept partial retrocession which will enable
tribes to exercise referral jurisdiction as provided in section 101(b) of
this Act [25 USCS § 1911(b)], or, where appropriate, will allow them to
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exercise exclusive jurisdiction as provided in section 101(a) [25 USCS
§ 1911(a)] over limited community or geographic areas without regard
for the reservation status of the area affected.
) Approval of petition; publication in Federal Register; notice; reassump<>n period; correction of causes for disapproval. If the Secretary approves
iy petition under subsection (a), the Secretary shall publish notice of such
iproval in the Federal Register and shall notify the affected State or
ates of such approval. The Indian tribe concerned shall reassume jurisction sixty days after publication in the Federal Register of notice of
>proval. If the Secretary disapproves any petition under subsection (a),
ie Secretary shall provide such technical assistance as may be necessary to
lable the tribe to correct any deficiency which the Secretary identified as
cause for disapproval.
.) Pending actions or proceedings unaffected. Assumption of jurisdiction
ider this section shall not affect any action or proceeding over which a
>urt has already assumed jurisdiction, except as may be provided pursuit to any agreement under section 109 of this Act [25 USCS § 1919].
>Iov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 108, 92 Stat. 3074.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
References in text:
"The Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as amended by title IV of
the Act of April 11, 1968 (82 Stat. 73, 78)", referred to in this section,
is Act Aug. 15, 1953, ch 505, 67 Stat 588, as amended by Act Apr. 11,
1968, P. L. 90-248, Title IV, B2 Stat. 79. For full classification of such
Act, consult USCS Tables volumes.
CROSS REFERENCES
This section is referred to in 25 USCS §§ 1727, 1923.

1919. Agreements between States and Indian tribes
i) Subject coverage. States and Indian tribes are authorized to enter into
•reements with each other respecting care and custody of Indian children
id jurisdiction over child custody proceedings, including agreements
hich may provide for orderly transfer of jurisdiction on a case-by-case
asis and agreements which provide for concurrent jurisdiction between
uites and Indian tribes.
>) Revocation; notice; actions or proceedings unaffected. Such agreements
iay be revoked by either party upon one hundred and eighty days' written
v)tice to the other party. Such revocation shall not affect any action or
(oceeding over which a court has already assumed jurisdiction, unless the
;reement provides otherwise.
NJOV. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 109, 92 Stat. 3074.)
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CROSS REFERENCES
This section is referred to in 25 USCS §§1918, 1923.

§ 1920. Improper removal of child from custody; declination of
jurisdiction; forthwith return of child: danger exception
Where any petitioner in an Indian child custody proceeding before a State
court has improperly removed the child from custody of the parent or
Indian custodian or has improperly retained custody after a visit or other
temporary relinquishment of custody, the court shall decline jurisdiction
over such petition and shall forthwith return the child to his parent .or
Indian custodian unless returning the child to his parent or custodian
would subject the child to a substantial and immediate danger or threat of
such danger.
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 110, 92 Stat. 3075.)

§ 1921. Higher State or Federal standard applicable to protect
rights of parent or Indian custodian of Indian child
In any case where State or Federal law applicable to a child custody
proceeding under State or Federal law provides a higher standard of
protection to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian
child than the rights provided under this title [25 USCS §§ 1911 et seq.],
the State or Federal court shall apply the State or Federal standard.
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 111, 92 Stat. 3075.)
§ 1922. Emergency removal or placement of child; termination;
appropriate action
Nothing in this title [25 USCS §§1911 et seq.] shall be construed to
prevent the emergency removal of an Indian child who is a resident of or
is domiciled on a reservation, but temporarily located off the reservation,
from his parent or Indian custodian or the emergency placement of such
child in a foster home or institution, under applicable State law, in order to
prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child. The State
authority, official, or agency involved shall insure that the emergency
removal or placement terminates immediately when such removal or
placement is no longer necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or
harm to the child and shall expeditiously initiate a child custody proceeding subject to the provisions of this title [25 USCS §§ 1911 et seq.], transfer
the child to the jurisdiction of the appropriate Indian tribe, or restore the
child to the parent or Indian custodian, as may be appropriate.
(Nov. 8, 1978, P. L. 95-608, Title I, § 112, 92 Stat. 3075.)
§ 1923. Effective date
None of the provisions of this title [25 USCS §§ 1911 et seq.], except
sections 101(a), 108, and 109 [25 USCS §§ 1911(a), 1918, and 1919], shall
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tfTect a proceeding under State law for foster care placement, termination
if parental rights, preadoptive placement, or adoptive placement which
was initiated or completed prior to one hundred and eighty days after the
nactment of this Act [enacted Nov 8, 1978], but shall apply to any
>ubsequent proceeding in the same matter or subsequent proceedings
effecting the custody or placement of the same child
(Nov 8, 1978, P L 95-608, Title I, § 113, 92 Stat 3075 )
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
Provisions of Indian Child Welfare Act (25
USCS § 1901 et seq ) do not apply on remand to
irial court of decision to terminate parental
rights where Act was not in effect at time
jurental rights were terminated and where there
his been no constitutional challenge to statute
itider which such rights were terminated A v

State (1981, Alaska) 623 P2d 1210
Provisions of Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 (25 USCS §§ 1901 et seq) do not apply to
action to vacate adoption where final adoption
hearing was held within 180 days after Novem
ber 8 1978 Re Adoption of Baby Nancy (1980)
27 Wash App 278, 616 P2d 1263

INDIAN C H I L D AND FAMILY P R O G R A M S
§ 1931. G r a n t s for on or near reservation programs and child
welfare codes
(a) Statement of purpose; scope of programs. The Secretary is authorized
to make grants to Indian tribes and organizations in the establishment and
operation of Indian child and family service programs on or near reservations and in the preparation and implementation of child welfare codes
The objective of every Indian child and family service program shall be to
prevent the breakup of Indian families and, in particular, to insure that the
permanent removal of an Indian child from the custody of his parent or
Indian custodian shall be a last resort Such child and family service
programs may include, but are not limited to—
(1) a system for licensing or otherwise regulating Indian foster and
adoptive homes,
(2) the operation and maintenance of facilities for the counseling and
treatment of Indian families and for the temporary custody of Indian
children,
(3) family assistance, including homemaker and home counselors, day
care, afterschool care, and employment, recreational activities, and
respite care,
(4) home improvement programs,
(5) the employment of professional and other trained personnel to assist
the tribal court in the disposition of domestic relations and child welfare
matters,
(6) education and training of Indians, including tribal court judges and
staff, in skills relating to child and family assistance and service programs,
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(7) a subsidy program under which Indian adoptive children may be
provided support comparable to that for which they would be eligible as
foster children, taking into account the appropriate State standards oi
support for maintenance and medical needs, and
(8) guidance, legal representation, and advice to Indian families involved
in tribal, State, or Federal child custody proceedings
(b) Non-Federal matching funds for related Social Security or othei
Federal financial assistance programs; assistance for such programs unaffected; State licensing or approval for qualification for assistance under
federally assisted program. Funds appropriated for use by the Secretary in
accordance with this section may be utilized as non-Federal matching
share in connection with funds provided under titles IV-B and XX of the
Social Security Act [42 USCS §§620 et seq, 1397 et seq] or under an>
other Federal financial assistance programs which contribute to the pur
pose for which such funds are authorized to be appropriated for use undei
this Act [25 USCS §§1901 et seq] The provision or possibility ol
assistance under this Act [25 USCS §§ 1901 et seq ] shall not be a basis for
the denial or reduction of any assistance otherwise authorized under titles
IV-B and XX of the Social Security Act [42 USCS §§ 620 et seq , 1397 et
seq ] or any other federally assisted program For purposes of qualifying
for assistance under a federally assisted program, licensing or approval ot
foster or adoptive homes or institutions by an Indian tribe shall be deemed
equivalent to licensing or approval by a State
(Nov 8, 1978, P L 95-608, Title II, § 201, 92 Stat 3075 )
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
Regulations implementing Indian Child Wei
fare Act of 1978 (25 USCS §§1931 to 1934) do
not permit Indian tribe to combine with social
services corporation within area designated near

reservation for social services funding purposes
Navajo Tribe v Commissioner of Indian Affairs
(1982) 89 ID 424

§ 1932. Grants for off-reservation programs for additional services
The Secretary is also authorized to make grants to Indian organizations to
establish and operate off-reservation Indian child and family service programs which may include, but are not limited to—
(1) a system fo» regulating, maintaining, and supporting Indian foster
and adoptive homes, including a subsidy program under which Indian
adoptive children may be provided support comparable to that for which
they would be eligible as Indian foster children, taking into account the
appropriate State standards of support for maintenance and medical
needs,
(2) the operation and maintenance of facilities and services for counsel
ing and treatment of Indian families and Indian foster and adoptive
children,
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(3) family assistance, including homemaker and home counselors, day
care, afterschool care, and employment, recreational activities, and
respite care, and
(4) guidance, legal representation, and advice to Indian families involved
in child custody proceedings
(Nov 8, 1978, P L 95-608, Title II, § 202, 92 Stat 3076)
CROSS REFERENCES
Tins section is referred to in 25 USCS § 1934

§ 1933. Funds for on and off reservation programs
(a) Appropriated funds for similar programs of Department of Health and
Human Services; appropriation in advance for payments. In the establishment, operation, and funding of Indian child and family service programs,
both on and off reservation, the Secretary may enter into agreements with
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and
Human Services], and the latter Secretary is hereby authorized for such
purposes to use funds appropriated for similar programs of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare [Department of Health and Human
Services] Provided, That authority to make payments pursuant to such
agreements shall be effective only to the extent and in such amounts as
may be provided in advance by appropriation Acts
(b) Appropriation authorization under 25 USCS § 13. Funds for the
purposes of this Act [25 USCS §§ 1901 et seq ] may be appropriated
pursuant to the provisions of the Act of November 2, 1921 (42 Stat 208),
as amended [25 USCS § 13]
(Nov 8, 1978, P L 95-608, Title II, § 203, 92 Stat 3076)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Explanatory notes:
The bracketed words "Secretary of Health and Human Services" and
"Department of Health and Human Services" are inserted on authority
of Act Oct 17, 1979, P L 96 88, Title V, § 509, 93 Stat 695, which
appears as 20 USCS § 3508, and which redesignated the Secretary and
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare as the Secretary and
Department of Health and Human Services, respectively, and provided
that any reference to the Secretary or Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in any law in force on the effective date of such Act
Oct 17, 1979, shall be deemed to refer and apply to fhe Secretary or
Department of Health and Human Services, respectively, except to the
extent such reference is to a function or office transferred to the
Secretary or Department of Education under such Act Oct 17, 1979
CROSS REFERENCES
This section is referred to in 25 USCS § 1934
§ 1934. "Indian" defined for certain purposes
For the purposes of sections 202 and 203 of this title [25 USCS §§ 1932,
1933], the term "Indian" shall include persons defined in section 4(c) of
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the Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976 (90 Stat 1400, 1401) [2"
USCS § 1603(c)]
(Nov 8, 1978, P L 95-608, Title II, § 204, 92 Stat 3077 )
RECORDKEEPING, INFORMATION AVAILABILITY, AND
TIMETABLES

§ 1951. Information availability to and disclosure by Secretary
(a) Copy of final decree or order; other information; anonymity affidavit
exemption from 5 USCS § 552. Any State court entering a final decree oi
order in any Indian child adoptive placement after the date of enactmen
of this Act [enacted Nov 8, 1978] shall provide the Secretary with a cop\
of such decree or order together with such other information as may l>
necessary to show—
(1) the name and tribal affiliation of the child,
(2) the names and addresses of the biological parents,
(3) the names and addresses of the adoptive parents, and
(4) the identity of any agency having files or information relating n
such adoptive placement
Where the court records contain an affidavit of the biological parent o
parents that their identity remain confidential, the court shall include sue!
aflidavit with the other information The Secretary shall insure that th
confidentiality of such information is maintained and such informatioi
shall not be subject to the Freedom of Information Act (5 U S C 552), a
amended [5 USCS § 552]
(b) Disclosure of information for enrollment of Indian child in tribe or fo
determination of member rights or benefits; certification of entitlement t<
enrollment. Upon the request of the adopted Indian child over the age o
eighteen, the adoptive or foster parents of an Indian child, or an Indiai
tribe, the Secretary shall disclose such information as may be necessary fo
the enrollment of an Indian child in the tribe in which the child may b
eligible for enrollment or for determining any rights or benefits associatu
with that membership Where the documents relating to such child contan
an affidavit from the biological parent or parents requesting anonymity, th
Secretary shall certify to the Indian child's tribe, where the informatioi
warrants, that the child's parentage and other circumstances of birth entitl
the child to enrollment under the criteria established by such tribe
(Nov 8, 1978, P L 95-608, Title III, § 301, 92 Stat 3077 )
§ 1952.

Rules and regulations

Within one hundred and eighty days after the enactment of this Ac
[enacted Nov 8, 1978], the Secretary shall promulgate such rules am
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